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Rielage and Fravel: Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 1949

book’s epilogue reminds the reader that the
U.S. Navy has a continuing need for small,
fast warships and daring sailors willing to
operate them against larger opponents.
Readers will appreciate the way the author
uses oral histories, letters, newspaper
accounts, deck logs, military afteraction reports, written recollections, and
background books and articles to tell an
engaging sea story. This historical narrative
will satisfy World War II buffs, sailors, and
casual-interest readers. It is a quick and
enjoyable read. Military scholars might appreciate the focused examination of small
boats. Domagalski deftly accomplishes his
mission: to pay homage to the intrepid warfighting spirit of the patrol boat and motor
torpedo boat sailors of World War II.
EDWARD GILLEN

Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since
1949, by M. Taylor Fravel. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton Univ. Press, 2019. 392 pages. $35.

During the Cold War, naval professionals
working to understand Soviet military
doctrine could call on a well-developed
body of literature. Authoritative Western
academic studies covered everything from
the Soviets’ overall strategic design to their
philosophy of troop leadership. Advanced
students could call on textbooks from
Soviet military colleges in translation.
Taken together, these works were essential
to understanding that the Soviet military
viewed warfare through a philosophical
lens fundamentally different from our own.
Today, professionals trying to understand
the modern Chinese approach to warfare
find comparatively meager fare. Western
academic interest in the approaches
taken by the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) to military strategy waned after the
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Maoist era. In many key areas, primary
sources are scarce—often passed from
practitioner to practitioner rather than
being widely available. While a few
overview works exist, there has been
little focused academic analysis of the
basics of Chinese military science.
In that context, Taylor Fravel’s volume on
PRC military strategy represents a groundbreaking contribution to Chinese military
studies. In Active Defense, Fravel analyzes
the nine “strategic guidelines” the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) has issued since
1949. Each strategic guideline provided
Chinese forces with four key elements: an
authoritative analysis of the Chinese strategic situation, an explanation of warfare
in the present era, and direction for both
force development and force employment.
Three of these documents—those issued
in 1956, 1980, and 1993—each represented
a major shift in direction for the PLA.
Rebutting those who see the PLA as
isolated and insular, Fravel concludes that
these three revisions were driven primarily
by PLA perception of significant shifts in
the conduct of modern warfare. While in
each case the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) wrote the overall analysis of the
strategic situation—which is, at its core,
a political assessment—the other three
component parts of each strategic guidance
document represented military judgments.
Fravel suggests that such fundamental
reassessments are possible only when the
party leadership is internally unified and
thus able to delegate this kind of work to
its military experts. Many Western readers,
focused on CCP control of the PLA, will be
surprised at this long-standing empowerment of the PLA military leadership to
decide foundational operational issues.
The level of trust the party extends to the
military leadership in strategy development
is only one of a number of arguments
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that will be both new to most readers
and controversial to specialists. While
granting the significant influence of the
Soviet Union on PLA development, Fravel
offers a nuanced view of Soviet influence
on PLA doctrine. During the 1950s, the
Soviet Union provided extensive support
to China, offering both military hardware
and advisers. Despite this close relationship, the 1956 strategic guidance was
developed in part to articulate a specifically
Chinese approach to warfare. While Soviet
doctrine emphasized abrupt and aggressive
offensive action, China remained mindful
that it would be fighting from a position of
relative weakness, so therefore at the operational level it focused instead on a dynamic
transition between offense and defense.
Fravel also notes that “people’s war”—a
powerful idea in Chinese Communist
ideology—was never officially a central
PLA military doctrine; rather, the PLA
used guerrilla warfare only in areas where
mobile forces could not be sustained. The
phrase people’s war properly referred to
the political integration of Communist
military forces with the population,
whether those forces were guerrilla bands
or armored columns. Fravel also provides
the best explanation yet of the lineage
and significance of the concept of active
defense, noting that Mao used the phrase
as early as 1935. Active defense was an
element of all nine strategic guidelines,

and PLA officers still cite it today as
an essential element of their strategy.
While the book covers the period from
1949 to 1993 extensively, the treatment
of PLA doctrine after 1993 consists of
only nineteen pages. The PLA issued new
strategic guidelines in 2004 and 2014,
but Fravel assesses that these did not
represent a basic shift in PLA approach.
Given the relative scarcity of sources
on more-recent PLA developments,
and the fact that strategic changes take
time to become apparent in forces, this
view could be subject to reassessment
in coming years. Nuclear strategy is
covered in a separate but well-crafted
section at the end of the book, reflecting Fravel’s assessment that nuclear
policy never was delegated to the PLA
and thus represents a distinct topic.
With its focus on the long-term development of Chinese military strategy, Active
Defense does not offer quick and easy
insights into current PLA operations.
Although Fravel does an admirable
job of balancing academic depth with
approachable overviews of complex
historical events, this is not the first book
a student should read on the PLA. It is,
however, an extraordinary work that will
endure as essential reading for any serious
student of Chinese military issues.
DALE C. RIELAGE
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